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.
  One of the most important arguments in favour of    y
price stability is that unexpected inﬂ  ation gener-
ates changes in the distribution of income and 
wealth among different economic agents. These 
redistributions occur because many loans in the 
economy are speciﬁ  ed in ﬁ  xed-dollar terms. Unex-
pected inﬂ  ation redistributes wealth from creditors 
to debtors by reducing the real value of nominal 
assets and liabilities. 
This article quantiﬁ  es the redistributional effects    y
of unexpected inﬂ  ation in Canada. To this end, 
we ﬁ  rst provide comprehensive evidence of the 
nominal assets and liabilities of various economic 
sectors and household groups.
We ﬁ  nd that the redistributional effects of unex-   y
pected inﬂ  ation are large even for episodes of low 
inﬂ  ation. The main winners are young, middle-
income households, who are major holders of 
ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage debt, and the government, 
since inﬂ  ation reduces the real burden of their 
debt for both groups. The losers are high-income 
households and middle-aged, middle-income 
households that hold long-term bonds and non-
indexed pension wealth.
T
here is ongoing research on potential reﬁ  ne-
ments to monetary policy regimes in countries 
with low and stable inﬂ  ation. In Canada, for 
example, a systematic review of the current inﬂ  ation-
targeting framework is underway (see the other 
articles in this issue). An issue that has received 
relatively less attention is the redistributional effects of 
unexpected inﬂ  ation.1 Redistributional effects occur 
because many savings, investments, and loans in 
the economy are speciﬁ  ed in money terms (i.e., not 
adjusted for inﬂ  ation); unexpected inﬂ  ation therefore 
redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers by 
lowering the real value of nominal assets and liabil-
ities.2 The analysis of these effects may be important 
since the welfare costs of inﬂ  ation depend not only on 
aggregate effects but also on potential redistributional 
consequences. Our calculations show that, even with 
an episode of low inﬂ  ation, the redistribution can be 
sizable. While this is a wealth transfer from one agent 
in the economy to another, a sense of who wins and 
who loses is essential in order to assess transitional 
costs and potential public support for reform.
The goal of this article is to provide insight into the 
redistributional effects of inﬂ  ation in Canada. The 
article is a summary of the recent research of Meh 
and Terajima (2008).3 The article proceeds as follows. 
The ﬁ  rst section documents nominal assets and 
liabilities (i.e., ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities that are 
denominated in Canadian dollars and not fully indexed 
to inﬂ  ation) held by different economic sectors and 
1  In this article, we focus on inﬂ  ation that is either unexpected or partially unexpected. If 
inﬂ  ation were completely expected, the change in the real value of the nominal claim 
would be incorporated in the contract. Hence, there would not be any redistribution.
2  On the other hand, lower-than-expected inﬂ  ation redistributes wealth from borrowers to 
lenders.
3  Meh and Terajima (2008) build on Doepke and Schneider (2006) who document nominal 
assets and liabilities in the United States and develop a methodology to compute the 
redistribution of wealth caused by inﬂ  ation.
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the methodology used to compute the redistribution 
of wealth induced by unexpected inﬂ  ation. Using this 
methodology and the documented nominal positions, 
the third section quantitatively assesses the redistri-
bution of wealth under episodes of low and moderate 
inﬂ  ation. The ﬁ  nal part of the article concludes.
Nominal Assets and Liabilities
Unexpected inﬂ  ation generates redistributions 
because most ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities are speci-
ﬁ  ed in money terms. For example, payments on ﬁ  xed-
rate mortgage contracts, bank deposits, non-indexed 
deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pension plans,4 government and 
corporate bonds, and other types of loans are gener-
ally not adjusted for unexpected inﬂ  ation. Hence, 
when inﬂ  ation is high, the value of these assets and 
liabilities falls in terms of purchasing power, since 
the prices of other goods and services go up with 
inﬂ  ation, but payments on these ﬁ  nancial claims are 
ﬁ  xed. The extent of the changes in the purchasing 
power of ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities also depends 
on the term to maturity, as we will show later on. In 
this section, we document Canadian holdings by 
type and maturity in various categories of assets and 
liabilities. Speciﬁ  cally, we look at asset and liability 
positions for three sectors: household, government, 
and non-residents.5 We also consider different groups 
of households. The objective is to show that, among 
these different groups of agents, holdings of nominal 
assets and liabilities differ in both qualitatively and 
quantitatively important ways. Given that these differ-
ences exist, there is potential for redistribution among 
them following inﬂ  ation shocks.
Unexpected inﬂ  ation generates redistri-
butions because most ﬁ  nancial assets 
and liabilities are speciﬁ  ed in money 
terms.
Data
We use two main data sets, both provided by 
Statistics Canada: the National Balance Sheet 
Accounts (NBSA) and the Survey of Financial Security 
4  Non-indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pension plans are those where retirees receive ﬁ  xed pay-
ments not adjusted for inﬂ  ation.
5  Since all businesses are owned by their shareholders, we allocate business sector portfo-
lios across the three sectors, based on each sector’s equity holdings.
(SFS). The NBSA documents the ownership of ﬁ  nan-
cial and non-ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities by sector. 
We use the NBSA to compute the net asset and 
liability positions of the household, government, and 
foreign sectors. The SFS is a household survey data 
set on income and wealth. We use the 2005 wave (the 
latest available), involving about 5,000 households, 
with weights to produce Canadian aggregates. It pro-
vides a comprehensive picture of assets and liabilities. 
For the sake of consistency, we use the 2005 NBSA 
and focus our analyses on the year 2005.
Categories of nominal assets and 
liabilities
Following Doepke and Schneider (2006), nominal 
assets and liabilities are deﬁ  ned as all ﬁ  nancial claims 
that are denominated in Canadian dollars and not fully 
indexed to inﬂ  ation. We report net nominal positions 
(i.e., assets minus liabilities) in four categories, deﬁ  ned 
as follows:6
Short-term •   – ﬁ  nancial assets and liabilities
  with a term to maturity less than or equal to 
  one year (e.g., domestic currency, bank 
  deposits, consumer credit, and short-term 
 paper)
Mortgages •   – all mortgage claims
Bonds •   – non-mortgage and non-pension 
  nominal claims with maturity greater than 
  one year, including government and 
  corporate bonds and bank loans
Pensions •   – employer pension plans without 
  provisions for indexing beneﬁ  ts to the cost 
  of living, including both deﬁ  ned-contribution
  plans and non-indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t 
 plans7
We distinguish among these categories because they 
differ in maturity structure. Differences in maturity 
will emerge as a key factor in assessing the extent of 
potential redistribution.
Sectoral positions
Table 1 shows net positions in each category, as well 
as the overall net nominal position (NNP) for each 
sector. Positions are expressed relative to gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2005. Positive numbers 
indicate net lending; negative numbers, net borrowing. 
6  For more details, see Meh and Terajima (2008).
7  Another type of plan is the indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t plan. These plans are treated as real 
assets, since inﬂ  ation will not affect them.
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different income classes, although with different 
magnitudes. Table 3 shows the positions of the 
three income classes, with the long-term category 
combining mortgages, bonds, and pensions.11 The 
general pattern of “borrowing more when young 
and lending more with age” holds across different 
income classes. We observe, however, that levels of 
borrowing relative to their net worth among young 
middle-income and low-income households are rela-
tively larger than they are for high-income households, 
mainly because the portfolios of low-income and 
middle-income households are concentrated in resi-
dential real estate (mortgages). This implies that while 
the young generally beneﬁ  t from inﬂ  ation, beneﬁ  ts are 
likely concentrated among low-income and middle-
income households.
11  The distribution of households as well as that of net worth by age group and income class 
is shown in Meh and Terajima (2008).
We observe that households are the main net nominal 
lenders overall, with NNP at 40.14 per cent of GDP. 
The government sector, at about 43 per cent of GDP, 
is the main counterparty borrowing from households. 
The foreign sector has a positive but small NNP 
of 2.85 per cent of GDP. Households tend to lend 
through short-term claims, bonds, and pensions, 
and borrow through mortgages. The government 
sector borrows mainly through bonds; it also bor-
rows through short-term claims and pensions.8 The 
non-resident sector lends in mortgages and bonds 
and owes in pensions.9 These observations suggest 
that households are the likely losers of unexpected 
inﬂ  ation, since it lowers the purchasing power of their 
lending (i.e., savings).
Household groups
We now look at the household sector in more detail, 
using the SFS data set. We examine three classes 
(low-income, middle-income, and high-income) and 
six age groups (under 36, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 
66–75, and over 75) to observe differences within the 
sector.10 Table 2 presents the overall positions for 
each age group as a percentage of the group’s net 
worth. We observe that the NNP increases with age, 
implying that households shift from being net bor-
rowers to net lenders as they get older. Most of the 
borrowing of the young is from mortgages. With age, 
more lending (i.e., saving) is observed in pensions and 
in liquid short-term claims. This implies that young 
households will gain from unexpected inﬂ  ation while 
older households will lose.
8  The government sector is a borrower in pensions as it holds liabilities from employer 
pension plans to its employees.
9  The borrowing in pensions by the non-resident sector indirectly reﬂ  ects the pension liabili-
ties of the business sector. As previously mentioned, we allocate business sector portfolios 
across the three sectors, based on each sector’s equity holdings.
10  The classes are deﬁ  ned based on a mix of income and wealth. For simplicity, we use the 
terms low-income, middle-income, and high-income to refer to each class. See Meh and 
Terajima (2008) for the details.
Table 1: Net Nominal Positions as a Percentage of GDP
Sectors Households Government Non-residents
Short-term claims 12.25 -7.60 -4.65
Mortgages -11.94 3.19 8.75
Bonds 22.14 -29.67 7.53
Pensions 17.69 -8.91 -8.79
NNP 40.14 -42.99 2.85
Table 2:   Nominal Positions as a Percentage of Net 
Worth by Age
Age Cohort
Under 36 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75 Over 75
Short-term claims 4.83 -1.01 1.48 2.40 9.00 12.27
Mortgages -37.95 -13.57 0.07 4.48 3.55 3.29
Bonds -2.63 4.70 6.50 7.90 6.70 7.68
Pensions -0.05 -1.31 5.01 7.36 8.68 8.65
NNP -35.80 -11.19 13.06 22.14 27.93 31.89
Table 3:   Nominal Positions as a Percentage of Net 
Worth by Age and Income Class 
Age Cohort
Under 36 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75 Over 75
High-income
   Short-term claims 3.86 -3.73 -1.97 -2.36 8.48 8.56
   Long-term claims -6.52 5.89 18.40 19.89 19.03 21.26
Medium-income
   Short-term claims 5.83 2.24 4.39 5.49 9.07 14.91
   Long-term claims -95.27 -28.71 7.01 20.55 20.29 18.97
Low-income
   Short-term claims 18.90 -0.06 5.04 13.84 12.58 10.96
   Long-term claims -71.01 -27.07 -8.30 6.89 1.57 12.79
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The goal of this section is to use the nominal positions 
documented above, combined with the methodology 
just described, to estimate the redistribution of wealth 
for an inﬂ  ation episode. Historically, inﬂ  ation episodes 
with different magnitudes lasting for extended periods 
have occurred. For example, between 2000 and 2004, 
the average inﬂ  ation rate in Canada was generally 
higher than the inﬂ  ation target rate of two per cent. To 
illustrate the inﬂ  ation-induced redistribution of wealth, 
we will consider a hypothetical inﬂ  ation episode that 
lasts ﬁ  ve years with an inﬂ  ation shock of one per cent, 
starting in the benchmark year 2005.12 
Redistribution across sectors
Table 4 summarizes the sectoral present-value gains 
and losses induced by an inﬂ  ation episode with one 
per cent shocks that continue for ﬁ  ve years, beginning 
in 2005, under the FS and IA inﬂ  ation scenarios.
It is apparent from the table that, under the two 
scenarios, the household sector loses, while the 
government sector wins. The household sector loss 
and the government gain are both large. Under FS, 
the household losses amount to 1.95 per cent of GDP 
(or $26.8 billion), while the government gain is 2.09 per 
cent (roughly 5 per cent of NNP). The non-resident 
sector loses, but the loss is small, just 0.14 per cent of 
GDP. To understand these ﬁ  ndings, recall that, under 
FS, gains and losses are directly proportional to the 
initial nominal positions. Since the household sector 
is the economy’s main lender and the government 
sector is the main borrower, it is not surprising that 
these sectors are the most dramatically affected by 
the shock under the FS scenario.
12  Under the current inﬂ  ation-targeting framework, inﬂ  ation has not exceeded expecta-
tions by one per cent for ﬁ  ve consecutive years. However, as a hypothetical scenario, we 
suppose price-level shocks that push inﬂ  ation to the upper bound of the range speciﬁ  ed in 
the current framework. The current annual inﬂ  ation target is two per cent with the target 
range extending from one to three per cent.
How Inﬂ  ation Causes 
Redistribution
Given the observed differences in nominal positions 
among households, government, and non-residents, 
unexpected inﬂ  ation should induce redistributions 
of real wealth. But how do we begin to identify the 
pattern and quantify the extent of the redistributions? 
The size of wealth redistribution depends on how 
economic agents adjust their expectations to inﬂ  ation 
surprises. We follow Doepke and Schneider (2006) 
by considering two scenarios that provide upper and 
lower bounds on the redistribution of wealth. The 
upper bound is captured by a “full-surprise” scenario 
(hereafter FS). In this scenario, during several years of 
experiencing inﬂ  ation shocks, agents do not anticipate 
that shocks will continue in subsequent periods; nom-
inal interest rates remain unchanged and the inﬂ  ation 
shock lowers the real value of nominal positions each 
period, regardless of the duration of these positions. 
The size of wealth redistribution depends 
on how economic agents adjust their 
expectations to inﬂ  ation surprises.
The lower bound is given by an “indexing ASAP” 
scenario (hereafter IA), where agents adjust their 
expectations after the initial shock to take into 
account the full duration of the shock. This scenario 
is also known as a gradual inﬂ  ation episode, since 
inﬂ  ation is partially anticipated. Under the IA scen-
ario, the nominal yield curve is adjusted upwards to 
incorporate the inﬂ  ation shock. As a result, under the 
IA scenario, inﬂ  ation-induced gains or losses depend 
on the maturity of the nominal position. The position 
is “locked-in” at the pre-shock nominal interest rate 
until its maturity date but must be discounted using 
the new nominal rate, resulting in a lower present 
value. Intuitively, present-value gains or losses for a 
claim are larger under the FS scenario because all the 
positions are affected equally by the inﬂ  ation episode. 
Under the IA scenario, however, long-term positions 
are affected more drastically than shorter positions. 
Agents are able to mitigate their losses on instruments 
that mature before the inﬂ  ation episode ends. Our 
calculations are based on a present-value analysis, 
described in Box 1. Box 2 discusses how we assign 
terms to maturity for each category of claims.
Table 4:   Redistribution of Wealth across Sectors as 
a Percentage of GDP, with a One Per Cent Inﬂ  ation 






scenario -1.95 12.53 -14.48 2.09 -0.14
Indexing ASAP 
scenario -1.26 7.61 -8.86 1.49 -0.23
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targeting. This point is summarized in Crawford, Meh, and Terajima (this issue) and analyzed 
in detail in Meh, Ríos-Rull, and Terajima (2008).
Box 1
Present-Value Analysis of Redistributions1
Full-surprise (FS) Scenario
We start with an explanation of how unexpected 
inﬂ  ation changes the purchasing power of a nominal 
claim. Consider an  -year, zero-coupon bond with a 
total nominal yield at time   of  . In the absence of 
unexpected inﬂ  ation, the present value of one dollar 
earned in   periods through investment in this ﬁ  nancial 
claim is given by
,
where   indicates the exponential function to base  .
Suppose that at time  , there is a one-time surprise 
increase in inﬂ  ation of   per cent per year that lasts for 
 periods. Under the FS scenario, since the inﬂ  ation 
shock in each subsequent period is unanticipated, 
market expectations do not adjust and the nominal 
term structure is unchanged. As a result, only a pro-
portion,  , of a position’s present value 
remains, and this proportion falls as the size and 
duration of the shock increase. The present value of 
this nominal claim under FS,  , is thus given by
This equation shows that the present value of a one-
dollar claim at time   is independent of the term to 
maturity of that claim. The present-value gain or loss, 
, is given by 
The net present value of gain or loss depends only on 
the size and duration of the shock and the initial nom-
inal position. The gain is, indeed, proportional to the 
pre-shock position, with a coefﬁ  cient of  .
If  , then there is a gain from the inﬂ  ation 
episode; otherwise, there is a loss. In order to derive 
the total gain or loss of an economic agent (e.g., a 
sector or a household),   is calculated for each 
claim with a term to maturity  . The gains or losses 
are then summed over all claims to derive the net 
redistribution.
Indexing ASAP Scenario
The indexing ASAP scenario corresponds to a one-
time announcement at period   that, starting from the 
current period  , inﬂ  ation will be   percent higher than 
expected during each period for the next   periods. 
Assuming that the announcement is credible, bond 
markets will immediately revise their inﬂ  ation expecta-
tions and incorporate these updates into the nominal 
yield curve. Assuming that the real curve does not 
change after the shock and that the Fisher equation 
holds, the new nominal interest rate used to discount 
a claim is  . Therefore, the present 
value,  , of a claim under IA is 
As can be seen from this equation, in contrast to the 
FS scenario, under IA, a ﬁ  nancial position of maturity 
 will be affected only for the   periods of its dur-
ation, before which the agent is assumed to reinvest 
at the pre-shock real yield. This is analogous to the 
agent’s reinvesting in a claim that offers a nominal rate 
of return that has been indexed to take the inﬂ  ation 
announcement into account. The present-value gain 
or loss of a claim of maturity   under IA is given by:
Hence, under IA, the present-value gain or loss 
depends on (i) the size of the shock ( ), (ii) the duration 
of the shock ( ), (iii) the initial nominal position  ,
and (iv) the maturity of the claim ( ). On the other 
hand, as mentioned above, the gain or loss under 
the FS scenario for any position is independent of its 
maturity. The IA scenario provides a lower bound for 
gain or loss on a claim, since it assumes full adjust-
ment of expectations to the path of inﬂ  ation following 
the initial announcement. The total gain or loss of 
an economic agent is derived in the same way as in 
the FS scenario, based on the sum of the gains and 
losses from each claim.
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Box 2
Term-to-Maturity Structure
In this box, we describe how terms to maturity are 
determined for each claim. For ﬁ  nancial short-term 
claims, we assume that they all have one-year 
terms to maturity, such that we set   = 1. For 
mortgages, we apply the distribution of ﬁ  xed-rate 
mortgages by term in 2005.1 The distribution is 
obtained using the Canadian Financial Monitor 
data set from Ipsos Reid Canada, which is com-
piled from a household survey containing detailed 
mortgage information. Chart A presents the distri-
bution of mortgages across terms of mortgages, 
weighted by outstanding balances. It shows that 
the most common term of Canadian ﬁ  xed-rate 
mortgages is ﬁ  ve years.
Based on the fractions we obtain from Chart A, 
we assign a weight for each  . For example, we 
assign a 60 per cent weight to  .
We take a similar approach for bonds. We derive 
a maturity distribution from quarterly data on the 
maturity and face value of federal government 
debt.2 Chart B shows the distribution from the 
fourth quarter of 2005. We assume that the distri-
bution of terms to maturity for federal government 
bonds approximates that for all instruments in this 
category.
For pensions, we focus on two types of pension 
plans: deﬁ  ned-contribution and non-indexed 
deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t plans. For deﬁ  ned-contribution 
plans, we assume that the average investment 
portfolio is approximated by the holdings of 
Trusteed Pension Plans.3 The assets of Trusteed 
Pension Plans are given in the NBSA. We compute 
the distributions of these assets over terms to 
maturity and use them to assign weights to each   
value. For non-indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t plans, we 
assume a ﬁ  xed stream of annual post-retirement 
payments. When calculating the present-value 
1  The term of mortgage is the length of the current mortgage agreement. A mortgage 
can have a long amortization period, such as 30 years, with a shorter term, such as 
5 years. When the term expires, a new term agreement can begin at the prevailing 
interest rate. The term of mortgage, rather than the amortization period, is relevant 
for our analysis.
2  These data were obtained from the Bank of Canada’s Communication, Auction and 
Reporting System database. See Meh and Terajima (2008) for more details.
3  Trusteed Pension Plans hold approximately 70–75 per cent of employer pension 
plan assets. See Meh and Terajima (2008) for more details.
gains and losses of pension assets, we apply the 
formulas in Box 1 to each payment, then sum 
all the gains or losses. In assigning the term to 
maturity of each payment, we set   based on the 
difference between the current age of the house-
hold and the age at the time of the payment.worth. The gains of the young low-income group 
come largely from their holdings of student loans 
and mortgage debt. Note that this group actually 
experiences greater gains under IA. As in the case for 
the non-resident sector, this occurs when there is a 
maturity mismatch. More speciﬁ  cally, while the gains 
associated with their net borrowing positions in bonds 
and mortgages do not vary much between inﬂ  ation 
scenarios, the losses associated with their savings in 
short-term instruments are mitigated under IA, since 
these claims mature before the shock has ended. 
The main winners are young, middle-
income households with large, ﬁ  xed-rate 
mortgage debts.
More age groups among low-income housholds 
beneﬁ  t from the inﬂ  ation episode than those among 
the middle class or the high-income under FS. This 
is because low-income households remain net bor-
rowers through to age 56, and therefore the youngest 
three groups among the low-income are winners. In 
general, older middle- and high-income households 
bear most of the losses under the two inﬂ  ation 
scenarios. More speciﬁ  cally, under the FS scenario, 
high- and middle-income households over age 75 are 
the sector’s greatest losers, with losses accounting 
for 1.45 per cent and 1.64 per cent, respectively, of 
their respective average net worth. These losses are 
It is also clear that gains and losses are generally 
smaller under IA. The household sector loss under IA 
is 1.26 per cent of GDP (or $17.3 billion), compared 
with 1.95 per cent under FS. This change is driven by 
a reduction in the losses associated with the sector’s 
net savings in long-term bonds and pensions relative 
to the FS case. The change is offset somewhat, since 
instruments with a shorter maturity are less sensitive 
to gradual inﬂ  ation, and the gains associated with the 
sector’s net debt in mortgage markets shrink relative to 
the FS case. The government gain drops from about 
2.1 per cent of GDP under the FS scenario to about 
1.5 per cent under the IA scenario—i.e., it shrinks by 
almost one-third. This occurs because the govern-
ment borrows through some bonds that have matur-
ities of less than ﬁ  ve years. The non-resident sector’s 
losses, although small, increase from 0.14 per cent of 
GDP under FS to 0.23 per cent of GDP under IA. 
Finally, Table 4 shows gross redistributions for the 
household sector—i.e., it distinguishes between 
losses associated with lending and gains associated 
with borrowing. It should be clear from these results 
that net calculations substantially understate how 
much wealth is shifted around. Under FS, the house-
hold sector gains 12.53 per cent of GDP and loses 
14.48 per cent, implying a total gross redistribution 
of 27.01 per cent of GDP. In other words, household 
wealth worth 27 per cent of GDP is reshufﬂ  ed. Under 
IA, the total gross redistribution is 16.47 per cent of 
GDP.
Redistribution between household types
Even though the household sector as a whole loses 
from surprise inﬂ  ation, the loss (or gain) is not uniform 
across different types of households. For different 
groups of households, we calculate the redistribution 
of wealth induced by the inﬂ  ation episode described 
above. Table 5 reports the present-value gains and 
losses as a percentage of the average net worth of 
each group for FS and IA.
Overall, with respect to age categories, young house-
holds beneﬁ  t from inﬂ  ation and older households lose. 
On the income dimension, the right column of the 
table indicates that high-income households lose the 
most and the loss declines as income becomes lower. 
Speciﬁ  cally, the main winners are young, middle-
income households with large, ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage 
debts. Their gain as a proportion of mean net worth is 
large: 4.34 per cent under FS and 3.91 per cent under 
IA. The second group of winners is the young, low-
income group, who enjoy, on average, gains between 
2.53 per cent and 2.66 per cent of their average net 
Table 5:   Redistribution of Wealth across Households 
as a Percentage of Net Worth by Age and Income 




36 36–45 46–55 56–65 66–75 Over 75 All
Full-surprise 
scenario
   All 1.74 0.54 -0.63 -1.07 -1.36 -1.55 -0.53
   High-income 0.13 -0.10 -0.80 -0.85 -1.34 -1.45 -0.68
   Middle-income 4.34 1.28 -0.55 -1.26 -1.42 -1.64 -0.42
   Low-income 2.53 1.32 0.16 -1.01 -0.69 -1.15 -0.16
Indexing ASAP 
scenario
   All 1.66 0.44 -0.54 -0.84 -0.83 -0.82 -0.34
   High-income 0.26 -0.18 -0.74 -0.76 -0.82 -0.86 -0.55
   Middle-income 3.91 1.15 -0.43 -0.94 -0.89 -0.81 -0.19
   Low-income 2.66 1.15 0.28 -0.42 -0.17 -0.56 0.14
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large even for episodes of low inﬂ  ation. For example, 
during an episode of low inﬂ  ation, where inﬂ  ation is 
one per cent above expectations for ﬁ  ve consecutive 
years, the loss of wealth among the household sector 
as a whole could amount to the equivalent of two 
per cent of GDP, or $27 billion. Among the main win-
ners are young, middle-income households, who are 
major holders of ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage debt, and the 
government, since inﬂ  ation reduces the real burden 
of their debts. The losers are a combination of high-
income households; middle-aged, middle-income 
households; and old households, who hold long-term 
bonds and non-indexed pension wealth. Non-indexed 
pension assets play an important role in the losses of 
old households. 
A natural question arising from these results is 
whether these redistributions have implications for the 
aggregate economy and welfare. These issues are 
analyzed in recent research by Meh, Ríos-Rull, and 
Terajima (2008), whose ﬁ  ndings are also summarized 
in Crawford, Meh, and Terajima (this issue).
mainly owing to their large positions in bonds and 
non-indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pensions. Table 5 also 
shows that most high-income households lose from 
the inﬂ  ation episode. 
Older middle- and high-income house-
holds bear most of the losses . . . owing 
to their large positions in bonds and 
non-indexed deﬁ  ned-beneﬁ  t pensions.
Conclusion
In this article, we quantify the redistributional effects 
of unexpected inﬂ  ation in Canada. To this end, we 
ﬁ  rst provide comprehensive evidence of the nominal 
assets and liabilities of various economic sectors 
and household groups. We then conduct experi-
ments examining the redistributional consequences 
of various inﬂ  ation episodes. The key ﬁ  nding is that 
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